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Maintaining Capital in the Secondary Mortgage
Market: Housing Finance Reform and the Liquidity
Coverage Ratio
I. INTRODUCTION
In an opening statement regarding new liquidity, risk
management, and capital standards for banks, Federal Reserve Board
(the “Board”) Governor Daniel K. Tarullo said, “[t]he most important
contribution we can make to the global financial system is to ensure the
stability of the U.S. financial system.”1 This statement reflects the
widespread and lasting effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover,
Tarullo was merely echoing the central mandate of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DoddFrank”).2
One of the enhanced prudential standards mandated by section
165 of Dodd-Frank is the newly approved minimum liquidity coverage
ratio (“LCR”) which is intended to ensure the short-term stability of
financial institutions during times of strained liquidity.3 To comply
with the LCR, financial institutions will be required to maintain
sufficient liquidity to withstand forecasted net cash outflows over a
thirty-day period during a stressed economic scenario.4 Whether a
financial institution has sufficient liquidity for purposes of the LCR is
determined by the institution’s aggregate holdings of certain asset
classes defined in the rule as High-Quality Liquid Assets (“HQLA”).5

1. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening
Statement at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Feb. 18, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20140218a-tarullostatement.htm).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (declaring that the purpose of the Act is “[t]o
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system”).
3. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
4. Id. For a full discussion of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, see infra Part II.
5. Id.
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This new rule and its definition of HQLA may have serious unintended
consequences for housing finance reform efforts currently underway in
Congress.6
This Note argues that the recently adopted LCR rule must be
accounted for in any housing finance reform bill passed by Congress,
and may potentially require a rewrite of certain aspects of the rule in
order to prevent serious harm to the primary and secondary mortgage
markets, banks, and the U.S. economy.7 This Note focuses on the
wisdom of excluding certain asset classes, namely private label
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and collateralized mortgage
obligations (“CMOs”),8 from the LCR rule’s definition of HQLA.9
The rule’s HQLA definitions are critical to the LCR calculation
and may dramatically affect the assets financial institutions choose to
hold on their balance sheets in order to comply with the LCR
requirement.10 Should Congress eventually pass housing finance reform
legislation, these investment decisions may be even more limited than
See infra Part V.
This Note will not address the policy behind instituting a liquidity coverage ratio.
For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that such regulation is necessary to ensure
the adequate short-term liquidity of financial institutions. For a discussion on this topic, see
Andrew W. Hartlage, Note, The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Financial Stability,
111 MICH. L. REV. 453 (2012) (discussing shortcomings of the LCR as a means of
regulating liquidity), and Adam R. Lewis, Note, North Carolina Community Banks:
Survival Strategies for Turbulent Times, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 343–44 (2013)
(critiquing the LCR’s disproportionately negative impact on smaller community banks).
8. MBS generally break down into two categories: CMOs and mortgage pass-through
securities (otherwise known as participation certificates). CMOs are backed by a pool of
mortgage loans and/or pass-through securities and divided into multiple tranches with
varying characteristics such as principal and interest payments, maturity dates, and payment
priority among tranches. In contrast, pass-through securities entitle each holder to a pro rata
share of the principal and interest payments made on the pooled mortgage loans. Mortgage&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
Backed Securities,
U.S.
SEC.
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last updated July 23, 2010).
9. The final LCR rule refers generally to MBS as “[a] security issued by, or
guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and interest” and does not explicitly
mention either CMOs or pass-through securities. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk
Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61440, 61529 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). Therefore, given that both are MBS, this Note assumes that the
language in the final LCR rule referring to MBS includes both CMOs and pass-through
securities. Industry analysts are unsure how CMOs will be treated, but Credit Suisse
analysts believe they will count as HQLA. Jody Shenn, Banks Left Guessing If Mortgage
Bonds Liquid Under Rules, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 476, 476 (Sept. 5, 2014).
10. See, e.g., Comment Letter from David H. Stevens, President and Chief Exec.
Officer, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, to the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 5, 2014),
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=TREASDO-2014-0005.
6.
7.
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intended by the final LCR rule.11 The housing finance reform bills
currently being considered by Congress would wind down the Federal
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”).12 These government
sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”)13 are currently the primary issuers of
MBS.14 GSE-issued MBS are designated as HQLA and included in the
LCR calculation.15 However, private label MBS fall outside the rule’s
definition of HQLA.16 Therefore, proposed housing finance reform
legislation that would eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might
unintentionally eliminate MBS, as a whole, from inclusion in the LCR
calculation.17
Without future GSE securitizations, the LCR rule will
discourage financial institutions from holding MBS in their liquidity
portfolios if the only MBS available do not count towards regulatory
compliance.18 Such a shift in the allocation of capital away from
mortgage securities has the potential to dramatically impact the housing
finance market by drying up funds currently available for mortgage
origination.19
See infra Part IV.B.
Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th
Cong. § 101 (2014); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R.
2767, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013); Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014,
H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 305 (2014).
13. The term “GSE” refers to the Farm Credit System and the Federal Home Loan
Bank (“FHLB”) System in addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Liquidity Coverage
Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61457 n.41.
14. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, U.S. MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES ISSUANCE
AND OUTSTANDING (Jan. 5, 2015), available at http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx
(showing that GSE MBS accounted for $1.2 trillion out of $1.3 trillion in total MBS issued
in 2014).
15. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61529.
16. Id. at 61464–65.
17. Two of the three legislative proposals currently before Congress would replace
GSE MBS with either a new MBS issuing entity or an enhanced Ginne Mae. The question
is whether or to what extent these new MBS would qualify as HQLA. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, Managing Director, Head of
Securitization, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 8,
2014), available
at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=TREAS-DO-20140005 (stating that the LCR may decrease liquidity in the secondary mortgage market by
providing a disincentive to hold private label MBS).
19. See MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, COST OF HOUSING
FINANCE REFORM 5 (Nov. 2013), available at https://www.economy.com/markzandi/documents/2013-11-20-Cost-of-Housing-Finance-Reform.pdf
(“[I]nvestors, who
11.
12.
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the purpose
and calculation of the newly finalized LCR rule and the financial
institutions to which it applies (“covered companies”).20 Part III lays a
quantitative foundation necessary to understand the broader economic
implications of the LCR.21 Part IV discusses current legislative
proposals to reform the housing finance market and the potentially
dangerous interplay between this legislation and the LCR.22 Finally,
Part V offers two alternatives for ameliorating the potential unintended
consequences of the LCR on housing finance reform.23
II. FINALIZED LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO

A.

Background and Purpose of the LCR

The LCR aims to improve the liquidity of large financial
institutions.24 Specifically, the LCR purports to strengthen the financial
stability of covered financial institutions by reducing their liquidity risk
profile in conformity with the enhanced prudential standards mandated
by section 165 of Dodd-Frank.25 On October 24, 2013, the Board
adopted a proposed rule establishing the LCR.26 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (“OCC”) (collectively with the Board, the “Agencies”)
followed closely in proposing a “substantially identical” rule.27 The
currently are willing buyers of government-backed mortgage securities, would be unable to
purchase mortgage securities in a fully privatized system.”); see also DOUGLAS HOLTZEAKIN ET AL., AM. ACTION FORUM, REGULATORY REFORM AND HOUSING FINANCE: PUTTING
THE
“COST”
BACK
IN
BENEFIT-COST
(Oct. 25, 2012),
available at
http://americanactionforum.org/research/regulatory-reform-and-housing-finance-puttingthe-cost-back-in-benefit-cost (estimating the probable effect of Basel III capital standards
and the Qualified Mortgage provisions of Dodd-Frank on mortgage credit availability and
the broader housing market).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
25. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Proposes Rule to Strengthen Liquidity Positions of Large Financial Institutions (Oct. 24,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131024a.htm.
26. Id.
27. J. PAUL FORRESTER & JASON H.P. KRAVITT, MAYER BROWN LLP, THE US BANKING
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Agencies jointly issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on November
29, 2013, with a public comment period open until January 31, 2014.28
After considering the comments received during the public comment
period, the Agencies approved a final rule for the LCR on September 3,
2014.29
The final LCR rule is based on the international Basel III LCR
standard promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision.30 While the final LCR generally adheres to the Basel III
LCR, it diverges in several material provisions discussed more fully
below.31 Tarullo described the proposed LCR as a “super-equivalent”
to the Basel III LCR because it contains stricter provisions than those of
the Basel III LCR.32 Any departure from the international standard may
significantly affect the regulatory burden, operating costs, and
competitive advantage or disadvantage of financial institutions relative
to financial institutions in countries that adopt the Basel III LCR.33 For
REGULATORS PROPOSE A LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO FOR LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS
AND SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT NON-BANKS 1 (Nov. 1, 2013), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/912e2974-db38-43d4-909d853b68099fdb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ed9dcc6e-208c-42aa-9233873568123b66/UPDATE-Liquidity_Coverage_Ratio_Large_Banking_Orgs_1013.pdf.
28. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards,
and
Monitoring, 78 Fed. Reg. 71818 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
249).
29. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Banking
Regulators
Finalize
Liquidity
Coverage
Ratio
(Sept.
3,
2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140903a.htm.
30. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61440. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY
COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (Jan. 2013), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf; About the Basel Committee, BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated June 20, 2014)
(“The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of
banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters.”).
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening
Statement at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Oct. 24, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131024a.htm).
33. A country that adopts stricter provisions than called for in the Basel III LCR rule
risks hampering the competitiveness of its financial institutions. See DONALD N. LAMSON ET
AL., SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, BASEL III FRAMEWORK: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (US
4
(Sept.
29,
2014),
available
at
IMPLEMENTATION)
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2014/09/DoddFrank—
Liquidity-Coverage-Ratio-Rule-Finalized-FIA-and-FR-092914.pdf (stating that the EU has
already adopted LCR rules that are consistent with the Basel III LCR and less stringent than
the final U.S. LCR). In adopting the final LCR rule, the Agencies acknowledged this
criticism, but ultimately decided to modify the Basel III LCR “to reflect the unique
characteristics and risks of the U.S. market and U.S. regulatory frameworks.” Liquidity
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these reasons, the ways in which the final LCR rule deviates from the
Basel III standards are of great importance to U.S. financial institutions.
The 2008 financial crisis was in large part a liquidity crisis occurring
within a highly interconnected financial industry.34
The
inadequate liquidity risk management at financial institutions prior to
the financial crisis contributed to the spread of the crisis and inhibited
the ability of financial institutions to weather the evaporation of shortterm credit.35 Poor liquidity risk management prior to the financial
crisis resulted in merger, federal bailout, and outright failure for many
financial institutions.36
The LCR attempts to remedy the liquidity shortcomings that
existed prior to the financial crisis.37 To that end, the LCR encourages
less reliance on short-term funding that may become unavailable during
a liquidity freeze and lower concentration of “asset classes that have a
significant liquidity discount if sold during a period of stress.”38 Further
clarification on asset classes the LCR encourages financial institutions
to hold, and how the LCR discourages reliance on short-term wholesale
funding are discussed below.39
In addition to remedying liquidity shortcomings, the LCR also
serves an important informational purpose. The final LCR intends to
provide greater detail to financial institutions, regulators, creditors,
debtors, and investors about the short-term liquidity position of a
More information about how financial
financial institution.40
institutions’ liquidity profiles vary over time and, in particular, during
adverse economic scenarios will facilitate more prudent management
and supervision of their liquidity risk and funding needs.41 This
Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61445.
34. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, Liquidity Crises: Understanding
Sources and Limiting Consequences: A Theoretical Framework 6, 8–9 (Fed. Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis, Economic Policy Paper 11-3, May 2011), available at
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4661& (arguing
that the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 were the result of investment
bank runs that sparked contagion effects throughout the financial industry).
35. See LAMSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 4.
36. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61448.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61445.
41. Id.
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additional data also enables both management and regulators to “take
appropriate actions to address liquidity needs; and, in situations of
failure, implement an orderly resolution of the covered company.”42
B.

Scope of the LCR and Calculation Under the Final Rule

The LCR targets “large and internationally active banking
organizations.”43 The final rule, however, also contains a provision for
a modified minimum LCR (“Modified LCR”) that applies to financial
institutions that are not internationally active and do not have significant
insurance or commercial activities.44 The Modified LCR imposes a
relatively lighter regulatory burden than the full LCR,45 so it is
important to understand what companies are covered by the LCR as
opposed to the Modified LCR.46
1. Covered Companies and Covered Depository Institution Subsidiaries
Financial institutions that qualify as covered companies are
subject to the LCR “because of their complexity, funding profiles, and
potential risk to the financial system.”47 Covered companies include:
(1) financial institutions with total consolidated assets greater than or
equal to $250 billion; (2) financial institutions with total consolidated
on-balance sheet foreign exposure greater than or equal to $10 billion;
(3) depository subsidiaries of the companies described under (1) and (2)
with $10 billion or more of total consolidated assets; and (4) financial
institutions that any of the Agencies deem appropriate based on the
institution’s “asset size, level of complexity, risk profile, scope of
operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic covered entities, or risk
to the financial system.”48
The scope of the rule encompasses bank holding companies and
savings and loan holding companies with total consolidated assets of
42. Id.
43. Id. at 61440.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 61521. Implementation of the Modified LCR does not begin until Jan. 1,

2016, one year later than the LCR. Id. Calculation of net outflows is also modified so as to
decrease the denominator of the Modified LCR. Id.
46. See infra Part II.B.1.
47. Id. at 61440.
48. Id. at 61524.
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$50 billion or more even if they do not meet the above requirements.49
They fall under the Modified LCR, however, which has less stringent
requirements.50 These Modified LCR holding companies do not escape
the LCR because the Agencies still view them as “large financial
companies with extensive operations in banking, brokerage, and other
financial activities” although less complex than the “covered
companies” subject to the full LCR.51 The final rule specifically
excludes community banks from the LCR or Modified LCR
requirements.52
The comment period resulted in a notable change to the final
rule by excluding nonbank financial companies from the scope of the
rule,53 even those designated by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (“FSOC”) as systemically important financial institutions
(“SIFI”).54 This provides only a temporary reprieve for these SIFIs, as
the Agencies intend to tailor the LCR to include them, either
individually, or within the category of nonbank financial companies,
taking into account “the business model, capital structure and risk
profile” of designated companies.55
2. Definition of HQLA
Before the LCR calculation can be explained, its constituent
49. Id. at 61540.
50. Id.; see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note

29.
51. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61522. The Modified LCR does not apply to certain grandfathered unitary savings and loan
holding companies and bank holding companies or savings and loan holding companies that
engage in insurance underwriting operations or significant activities that are not financial in
nature.
52. Id. at 61440.
53. Id. at 61446.
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §
113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012) (granting the FSOC authority to designate nonbank financial
company a SIFI subject to Board Supervision and Dodd-Frank prudential standards); see J.
PAUL FORRESTER ET AL., MAYER BROWN LLP, US BANKING REGULATORS ADOPT FINAL
RULE TO IMPOSE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO ON LARGE US BANKING INSTITUTIONS 1 (Sept.
5, 2014), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/US-Banking-Regulators-Adopt-FinalRule-to-Impose-Liquidity-Coverage-Ratio-on-Large-US-Banking-Institutions-09-05-2014/
(noting the exclusion of nonbank systemically important financial institutions or SIFIs from
the final rule).
55. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61446; see also FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54.
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parts must first be introduced in greater detail. The LCR is a ratio with
a numerator equal to the total amount of a financial institution’s HQLA
and the denominator equal to the net cash outflows from the financial
institution over a thirty-day period under stressed economic conditions
defined by the Agencies.56
The LCR rule, approved by the Agencies, provides specific
examples of assets that qualify for inclusion in the numerator as HQLA
as well as criteria for determining whether an asset qualifies as HQLA.57
The LCR rule divides HQLA into three asset classes: Level 1, Level
2A, and Level 2B.58 Level 1 assets consist of cash, U.S. Treasury and
government agency securities, and certain other sovereign debt and
development bank securities.59 Level 2A assets represent a riskier asset
class than Level 1 assets and include securities issued by the GSEs and
certain sovereign debt and development bank securities not classified as
Level 1.60 Level 2B assets are comprised of certain investment grade
corporate debt and certain publicly traded common equity shares.61
Whether an asset is a Level 1, Level 2A, or Level 2B determines
if the financial institution must apply a discount—commonly referred to
as a “haircut”—to the value of that asset when calculating HQLA.62
Furthermore, these levels determine whether that asset is capped at a
certain percentage of the financial institution’s liquidity portfolio.63 The
Level 1 category represents the safest and most liquid assets and,
therefore, no haircut or portfolio restrictions apply.64 Level 2A assets
receive a 15% haircut and Level 2B assets receive a 50% haircut in
order to compensate for the greater level of risk associated with those
assets.65 Furthermore, Level 2 assets combined cannot account for
greater than 40% of a financial institution’s HQLA, and Level 2B assets
56. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61528–29.
57. Id. at 61529–31; see also id. at 61526 (defining “liquid and readily-marketable”).
58. Id. at 61529.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. In general, Level 2B corporate debt must be investment grade, liquid and
readily marketable, and not issued by a financial sector company. Id. Level 2B common
equity shares must similarly be liquid and readily marketable, not issued by a financial
sector company, as well as traded on the Russell 1000 index. Id.
62. Id. at 61459.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 61530.
65. Id.
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alone cannot exceed 15% of an institution’s HQLA in order to
“prevent[] concentrations of less liquid assets and ensure[] a sufficient
stock of the most liquid assets to meet stressed outflows during a period
of significant market distress.”66
An asset’s classification is significant because it ultimately
determines whether the full amount of the asset will count towards
HQLA or whether its value will be reduced by a haircut. Other things
being equal, a Level 1 asset not subject to a haircut provides more value
to a financial institution than a Level 2 asset for the purposes of meeting
the institution’s required amount of HQLA necessary to comply with
the LCR.67 Likewise, an asset that is subject to a haircut, but
nonetheless counts towards HQLA, is relatively more valuable to a
financial institution in terms of complying with the LCR than an asset
that falls outside the HQLA definition.68 The LCR rule’s definition of
HQLA plainly contains an incentive for financial institutions to choose
to hold assets that have been “blessed” by the Agencies.
3. Net Outflows Calculation
The denominator of the LCR equation represents the net flow of
funds out of the financial institution during a hypothetical thirty-day
period of economic stress.69 Total projected outflows—contractual
payments, maturities, and estimated runoff in funding sources70—are
subtracted from the total projected inflows for the thirty-day period.71
The total projected inflows amount cannot be greater than 75% of the
total projected outflows72 in order to prevent financial institutions from
66. Id. at 61459.
67. See id. at 61530 (detailing the calculation of the adjusted liquid asset amounts due

to the haircuts applicable to Level 2A and 2B assets).
68. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES ADOPT
FINAL LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO REGULATIONS 3 (Sept. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/memo_9_24_2014.pdf
(“[S]ome
categories of assets, such as non-investment-grade corporate debt securities and private label
residential mortgage-backed securities, will have no value for purposes of U.S. liquidity
requirements.”).
69. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61444.
70. See id. at 61532–36 (defining assumptions for outflow rates of various funding
sources reflecting standardized stressed assumptions).
71. See id. at 61536–37 (listing assumptions for inflow rates of various sources of
funds also reflecting standardized stressed assumptions).
72. Id. at 61531.
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becoming “overly reliant on inflows, which may not materialize in a
period of stress.”73 Added to the amount of net outflows is the
difference between the highest cumulative outflow during the thirty-day
period and the final net cumulative outflow on day thirty.74 This
additional calculation is intended to identify liquidity pressures within
the thirty-day period that may not be apparent from the net outflow
amount.75
4. Calculation of the LCR
The fully phased-in LCR will require covered financial
institutions to hold an amount of HQLA on their balance sheets equal to
their total projected net cash outflows in a stressed scenario as detailed
above.76 Essentially, covered financial institutions should have an
amount of HQLA at least equal to the amount of cash the institution can
expect to leave the company over the thirty-day stress period.77 Stated
another way, HQLA over net outflows should equal at least one.78 In
theory, a ratio of at least one should provide an adequate amount of
creditworthy and easily-monetized assets to allow the financial
institution to meet its obligations as they come due during a short-term
crisis.79
C.

Differences Between the Finalized LCR and the Basel III LCR

The finalized LCR rule is based on the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision’s Basel III LCR.80 While the version of the LCR
adopted by the Agencies generally parallels the Basel III international
73. Id. at 61444.
74. LAMSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 2 (referencing the portion of the final rule to be

codified at 12 C.F.R. § 249.30(b)).
75. Id. (noting that this calculation goes beyond the Basel III standard).
76. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61528–29, 61531.
77. Id.
78. FORRESTER & KRAVITT, supra note 27, at 2.
79. Id. at 1–2.
80. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29; see also
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening Statement
at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Sept. 3, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/tarullo-statement-20140903.htm)
(adopting final LCR rule).
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standard,81 it contains an accelerated implementation timeline and
qualifies fewer assets as HQLA.82 By approving an LCR rule that
materially diverges from the international standard, the Agencies
increased the regulatory burden and operating costs of U.S. financial
institutions, thereby inhibiting their competitiveness with international
financial institutions.83 Adopting an LCR more in line with the
international standard would arguably achieve the liquidity goals of the
LCR with fewer unintended consequences.84
The Basel III standard requires each covered financial
institution to be 60% compliant with the LCR by January 1, 2015, with
10% annual increases until attaining 100% compliance by January 1,
2019.85 In contrast, the U.S. LCR requires a much more aggressive
phase-in. Financial institutions were required to be 80% compliant by
January 1, 2015, with 10% annual increases until fully compliant by
January 1, 2017.86 The Agencies stated “[t]he accelerated transition
period reflects a desire to maintain the improved liquidity positions that
U.S. institutions have established since the financial crisis, in part as a
result of supervisory oversight by U.S. bank regulators.”87 On the other
hand, industry commenters view the accelerated implementation as a
competitive disadvantage for U.S. global banks relative to foreign bank
competitors, as well as for U.S. regional banks that are less able to bear
the additional compliance costs relative to their larger competitors.88
See BASEL COMM., supra note 30.
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29.
See Jaymin Berg & Bill Warlick, Stricter U.S Bank Liquidity Rules to Affect
RATINGS
FITCH
WIRE
(Oct.
25,
2013),
Profitability,
FITCH
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Stricter-U.SBank?pr_id=806151 (explaining that the exclusion of assets that qualify as HQLA under the
Basel III standard, such as private label MBS, covered bonds, and municipal securities from
the definition of HQLA in the United States, will negatively affect bank profitability).
84. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61450. For example, one commenter cautioned that an LCR stricter than the Basel III LCR
“could lead to distortions in the market, such as dramatically increased demand for limited
supplies of asset classes and hoarding of HQLA by financial institutions.” Id.
85. See BASEL COMM., supra note 30, ¶ 10.
86. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61538.
87. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29.
88. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Michael P. Smith, President & Chief Exec. Officer
of the New York Bankers Ass’n, to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R1466&doc_ver=1 (“[T]he LCR requirements will interact with many of the laws and
regulations enacted in the last five years relating to capital, leverage and other prudential
81.
82.
83.
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The U.S. LCR also differs materially from the Basel III LCR in
its definition of asset classes that qualify as HQLA. While the U.S.
LCR excludes high-quality private label MBS, municipal debt,89 and
asset-backed securities, the Basel III LCR includes them as HQLA.90
Several industry commenters noted that such treatment of these assets
could result in higher funding costs and scarce capital for these
secondary markets.91 The U.S. LCR definition of HQLA entirely
excludes private label MBS, whereas GSE MBS are classified as Level
2A assets.92 The disparate treatment of these two classes of MBS will
be discussed in greater detail below, particularly the potential effect this
dichotomy will have if a housing finance reform bill passes Congress.93
The final LCR rule adopted by the Agencies contains clear
incentives for covered financial institutions.94 The LCR gives
preference to Level 1 assets such as U.S. Treasuries over Level 2 assets
such as investment grade corporate debt and GSE MBS.95 Similarly,
common equity is preferred over investment grade private label MBS
and municipal bonds.96 Although the Agencies downplay the potential

standards, in ways that may work against the goals of competitive equality, and
transparency across markets.”); see also Comment Letter from Paul E. Burdiss, Corp.
Treasurer of SunTrust Banks, Inc., to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R1466&doc_ver=1 (“[T]he LCR is not only unduly burdensome for smaller regional banks to
comply with on the proposed timeline, but it also implicitly grants a competitive advantage
to [large global banks].”).
89. OLIVER IRELAND & MICHAEL ONTELL, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT ALERT:
4,
2014),
available
at
FINALIZED LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (Sept.
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/09/140904FinalizedLiquidityCoverag
eRatio.pdf (although municipal securities are not included in the final rule, the agencies are
open to further consideration and inclusion of some of these securities at a later date).
90. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1.
91. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, Exec. Vice President and
Treasurer, Wells Fargo, to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1466&doc_ver=1.
92. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1.
93. See infra Part IV.B.
94. See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Regulators’ New Bank Liquidity Rule
May Negatively Impact Financing for Businesses, Consumers (Sept. 3, 2014),
http://fsroundtable.org/regulators-new-bank-liquidity-rule-may-negatively-impactfinancing-businesses-consumers/.
95. See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 61440, 61530 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329)
(detailing the calculation of the adjusted liquid asset amounts due to the haircuts applicable
to Level 2A and 2B assets).
96. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 3.
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effects of the incentives inherent in the LCR,97 financial institutions will
seek to comply with their regulatory obligations by shifting capital
away from these disfavored asset classes.98 If the Agencies were to
adopt the more inclusive Basel III definitions of HQLA, the shift
between assets would be less pronounced99 because more assets would
be classified as HQLA.100
III. SIZING THE IMPACT: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
PERSPECTIVES

A.

Quantitative Baseline to Assess Potential Impact of LCR on
Economy

In order to appreciate the LCR’s potential impact, one must first
appreciate the size of the mortgage market, both in terms of loans and
securitizations, as well as the structure of ownership. As of September
30, 2014, there was $13.4 trillion in total U.S. mortgage debt
outstanding, $9.9 trillion of which was residential.101 That amount
represents the mortgages on approximately 34 million homes.102 Of that
$13.3 trillion in mortgage debt, depository institutions held $4.1 trillion,
Fannie Mae held $3.0 trillion, Freddie Mac held $1.7 trillion, the
Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”)103 held

97.

Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at

61465.
See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, supra note 94, at 1.
See KEVIN BUEHLER ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., BETWEEN DELUGE AND DROUGHT:
THE FUTURE OF US BANK LIQUIDITY AND FUNDING 18–19 (July 2013),
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/risk/latest_thinking/working_papers_on_risk
(stating that banks will shift their holdings between Level 1 and Level 2 assets in order to
optimize profitability and compliance with the LCR).
100. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1.
101. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Dec.
11, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm.
102. Based on the average loan amount for all mortgage loans according to the Federal
Housing Finance Agency’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey from June 2014. STATE HOUSE
NEWS SERV., FHFA: Mortgage Interest Rates Down in June, Aug. 1, 2014.
103. Ginnie Mae is a “wholly-owned government corporation within the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)” that issues MBS explicitly
guaranteed by the U.S. government. Ginnie Mae’s Role in Housing Finance, GINNIE MAE,
http://www.ginniemae.gov/consumer_education/Pages/ginnie
_maes_role_in_housing_finance.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2013).
98.
99.
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$1.5 trillion, and private mortgage conduits held $1.1 trillion.104 As of
September 30, 2014, there was $7.1 trillion in outstanding U.S. Agency
MBS ($2.8 trillion issued by Fannie Mae, $1.6 trillion issued by Freddie
Mac, $1.5 trillion issued by Ginnie Mae) and $1.0 trillion in outstanding
residential private label MBS.105
Given the size of the MBS security market, it is also important
to consider who owns all of these securities. As of December 31, 2014,
the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) held over $1.7 trillion worth of
agency MBS.106 At that same point in time, all U.S. depository
institutions combined held $724.5 billion worth of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac MBS, $226.9 billion worth of Ginnie Mae MBS, $136.6
billion worth of privately issued residential mortgage-backed securities,
as well as $193.4 billion worth of GSE debt.107 In comparison, U.S.
depository institutions only held $345.5 billion worth of U.S. Treasury
securities.108 MBS, particularly GSE MBS, compose a significant
portion of bank portfolios especially compared to U.S. Treasuries.109
Since the financial crisis, the GSEs have dominated the MBS
market in both new issuance and market share at the expense of private
label MBS.110 Absent a meaningful change like housing finance reform,
the shrinking market share of private label MBS will continue.111 As of
July 31, 2014, the GSEs accounted for 99% of MBS issuance volume
for 2014 with private label MBS accounting for the remaining 1%.112 In
Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 101.
SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL
RELEASE: H.4.1 FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE BALANCES (Jan. 2, 2015), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/h41.pdf.
107. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REPORT: FDIC STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
(Sept.
30,
2014)
[hereinafter
FDIC
STATISTICS],
available
at
https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main.asp.
108. Id.
109. See Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC
16
(Jan. 31, 2014),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1466&doc_ver=1
(noting that GSE MBS compose a significant portion of regional bank portfolios).
110. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14.
111. See The Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities Market: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Sen. Tim
Johnson, Chair, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) (discussing the current
dearth of private capital in the mortgage market and stating that housing finance reform is
necessary to attract private capital back to the market).
112. Investor
Presentation,
FREDDIE
MAC
(Aug.
2014),
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf.
104.
105.
106.
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2013, the GSEs accounted for 98% of total MBS issuance and private
label MBS accounted for the remaining 2%, continuing the GSEs’
market dominance that began in 2008 during the financial crisis.113
Despite financial institutions’ seemingly vast current holdings of
securities, covered companies faced at least a $200 billion shortfall of
HQLA when the Agencies proposed the LCR rule in October 2013.114
To comply with the LCR rule, banks will be compelled to optimize their
liquidity portfolios by selling MBS and buying more lower-yielding
Level 1 assets.115 By adding regulatory value, as opposed to economic
value, to Level 1 assets, the LCR creates new incentives to hold these
asset classes at the expense of Level 2 assets like GSE MBS or excluded
assets like private label MBS.116
The Fed further complicated matters by ending its most recent
bond-buying program, known as quantitative easing (“QE”), in October
2014.117 Beginning in 2009, the Fed expanded its balance sheet through
three rounds of massive purchases of Treasury securities and GSE MBS
in order to stimulate economic activity.118 During the most recent round
(QE3), the Fed purchased $40 billion of GSE MBS per month.119
Standing alone, the LCR incentivizes banks to hold fewer MBS,
specifically private label MBS.120 The Fed ending its MBS purchases
combined with sales of MBS by financial institutions in order to comply
with the LCR creates the potential for a significant reduction in demand
113.
114.

Id.
P WC

FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY PRACTICE, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
REGULATORY BRIEF: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO: ANOTHER BRICK IN THE WALL 3 (Oct.
24, 2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatoryservices/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-act-basel-iii-fed-liquidity-coverageratio.pdf. Although this data came from the Board’s October 2013 meeting, the data is still
highly probative given the finalized rule is nearly identical to the proposed rule.
115. See Berg & Warlick, supra note 83 (“To achieve compliance with the proposed
LCR, Fitch believes banks would likely need to derisk their investment portfolios and move
towards very liquid lower-yielding government and agency securities.”).
116. Clifford Rossi, New Liquidity Rules Will Put a Drag on Mortgage Finance, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/new-liquidity-ruleswill-put-a-drag-on-mortgage-finance-1063544-1.html.
117. See Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Closes Chapter on Easy Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2014, at A1.
118. See Jeff Kearns, The Fed Eases Off: Tapering to the End of a Gigantic Stimulus,
QUICKTAKE
(Nov.
7,
2014),
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/federal-reserve-quantitative-easing-tape
(discussing the Fed’s three quantitative easing programs).
119. Hilsenrath, supra note 117.
120. Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, supra note 18, at 10.
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for MBS that may unintentionally siphon capital out of the secondary
mortgage market. As will be discussed further below, housing finance
reform bills currently in Congress have the potential to exacerbate this
flight of capital from the mortgage market.121
B.

Criticisms from the Public Comment Period

The Agencies received over 100 comments during the public
comment period from banks, nonbank financial firms, industry groups,
public officials, public interest groups, and other interested parties.122
Common themes appeared in the majority of financial industry
comments.123 Nearly all agreed that the LCR was necessary and a good
idea in principle.124 However, those same commenters found the U.S.
LCR far too strict and preferred a standard more similar to the Basel III
LCR.125 In particular, financial institutions criticized the exclusion of
high-quality private label MBS and municipal securities from HQLA.126
Many commenters expressed concern that excluding these assets
from the definition of HQLA would disrupt markets and harm
consumers, as well as state and local governments.127 These
commenters fear that exclusion would sap demand for municipal
securities which, in turn, would lead to increased borrowing costs for
municipalities, harming local economies and hindering infrastructure
investments.128
Commenters expressed similar concerns with regard to private
label MBS. They feared that excluding private label MBS from HQLA
would cause a shortage in demand for MBS, which they feared would
lead to decreased funding for mortgages and increased borrowing costs
See infra Part V.
Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61440, 61442 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
123. See DAN RYAN ET AL., PWC FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY PRACTICE,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO: NO BLOOD,
BUT SWEAT AND
TEARS (Apr. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financialservices/regulatory-services/publications/assets/us-liquidity-coverage-ratio.pdf (providing
an aggregate analysis of all the major issues raised during the public comment period).
124. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, supra note 91.
125. Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks, supra note 109.
126. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, supra note 91.
127. Id.
128. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61443.
121.
122.
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for consumers.129 In the view of many commenters, providing a way to
include highly-rated private label MBS in the definition of HQLA
would facilitate a return of private capital to the secondary mortgage
market and mitigate any impacts on mortgage rates for consumers.130
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN HOUSING FINANCE REFORM AND LCR
President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21,
2010,131 nearly two years after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
placed into government conservatorship.132 Despite the nearly $190
billion provided by the U.S. Treasury to the GSEs as part of their
bailout133 and its sweeping 848 pages of financial regulation, DoddFrank left unanswered the question of what to do with the GSEs and
how to reshape the U.S. housing finance system.134 Section 1074 of
Dodd-Frank directed the Secretary of the Treasury to “conduct a study
of and develop recommendations regarding the options for ending the
conservatorship of [Fannie Mae] and [Freddie Mac], while minimizing
the cost to taxpayers.”135 Although section 1074 deferred any definite
action on housing finance reform, it provided a timeline for beginning
the legislative process that was avoided in passing Dodd-Frank.136 It
also set the substantive agenda for any future housing finance reform
Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks, supra note 109.
Id.
Presidential Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 21, 2010).
132. History of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Conservatorships, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY
http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae—FreddieConservatorships.aspx (last accessed Oct. 9, 2014).
133. Id.
134. Action on the future of the GSEs was deferred despite an explicit Congressional
finding in Dodd-Frank that GSE reform was important and the conservatorship arrangement
was unsustainable. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) § 1491, 124 Stat. 1376, 2205–06 (2010).
135. Dodd-Frank § 1074, 124 Stat. at 2067. The study, “Reforming America’s Housing
Finance Market,” was released jointly by the Departments of Treasury and Housing and
Urban Development on February 11, 2011. The study concluded that Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac should be wound down, the government’s role in the housing market should be
reduced, and private capital should be encouraged to return to the market. David A. Luigs,
Whither Fannie and Freddie? Reform of the U.S. Secondary Mortgage Market, 5 FIN. INST.
REP. (Debevoise & Plimpton) No. 3, at 6, 7–9 (Mar. 2011).
136. See Dodd-Frank § 1074(b), 124 Stat. at 2068 (mandating the Secretary of the
Treasury provide a study on ending Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s conservatorship to both
the Senate Banking Committee and House Financial Services Committee by January 31,
2011).
129.
130.
131.
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legislation by requiring the Treasury Secretary’s report to address a
wide range of options for the GSEs including wholesale liquidation,
privatization, incorporation into a Federal agency, as well as any other
options the Treasury Secretary deemed viable.137
Several bills currently debated in Congress address the issues of
housing finance reform and the future of the GSEs, which Dodd-Frank
left unresolved. While each of these bills approaches the issue
differently, their proposals parallel the options identified in § 1074 of
Dodd-Frank.138 The legislative proposals currently before Congress
range from complete privatization of the mortgage market139 to a publicprivate hybrid mortgage market.140 Despite two separate bills passing
committee—one by the Senate Banking Committee141 and one by the
House Financial Services Committee142—each proposal only represents
a first step and significant alterations and compromises will be
necessary to gain enough support to pass both chambers of Congress.143
Furthermore, there is little indication that Congress will make
any meaningful progress toward passing housing finance reform
legislation even with the Republican Party now in control of both
chambers after the 2014 midterm elections.144 While some members of

137.
138.
139.

Dodd-Frank § 1074, 124 Stat. at 2067–68.
See infra Part IV.A.
For a discussion of the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of
2013 (“PATH”), see infra Part IV.A.2.
140. For a discussion of the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of
2014 (“Johnson-Crapo”), see infra Part IV.A.1
141. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Senate
Banking Committee (May
15,
2014),
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.MinorityNews&
ContentRecord_id=073129bb-cc29-7915-58af6ebdf149c1a2&Region_id=&Issue_id=&IsPrint=1 [hereinafter Senate Banking Committee].
142. Press Release, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Fin. Servs., PATH Act Passes
Committee
(July
24,
2013),
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343722
[hereinafter PATH Act Passes Committee].
143. See Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013: Hearing on S.
1217 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (May 15, 2014)
(statement of Sen. Tim Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs)
(“[Johnson-Crapo] is not the final product. This is only the first step toward real reform, and
we will continue to work together to improve the bill and attract additional support.”).
144. See Christopher Whalen, What Republicans’ Election Win Means for Housing
Reform, AM. BANKER (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/whatrepublicans-election-win-means-for-housing-reform-1071186-1.html (detailing several
obstacles to passing housing finance reform despite Republican majority control of
Congress).
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Congress are optimistic that housing finance reform legislation could
pass in 2015,145 some industry analysts are doubtful that Congress will
take up the issue before the 2016 presidential election, if it takes up the
issue at all.146 Even those optimistic about the prospects of housing
finance reform legislation concede that the current stability in the
housing market and profitability of the GSEs—profits which flow
directly to the U.S. Treasury—pose a significant impediment to any
action on reform.147 While any sustainable long-term reform of the
GSEs requires comprehensive Congressional action,148 the ultimate
design of the reform, in particular the extent of the government’s
involvement in the mortgage market,149 remains undetermined.150
Due to the varying provisions of the proposed legislation
currently before Congress, the future of the housing finance system will
look very different depending on which version ultimately becomes
law.151 In particular, MBS will take on different characteristics from

145. See Victoria Finkle, Maryland Congressman Hopeful for GSE Reform Resurgence,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_184/marylandcongressman-hopeful-for-gse-reform-resurgence-1070166-1.html (reporting on a housing
reform bill introduced by three congressmen and co-sponsored by another twelve); see also
Daniel Newhauser, Can Jeb Hensarling Learn to Compromise?, NAT’L J. DAILY (Sept. 23,
2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/can-jeb-hensarling-learn-to-compromise20140922.
146. See BEN LANE, LOOKS LIKE GSE REFORM TALKS WILL STRETCH INTO 2017, AT
LEAST, HOUSINGWIRE REWIRED
BLOG
(Apr. 30,
2014),
http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/29842-looks-like-gse-reform-talks-willstretch-into-2017-at-least; see also Jim Parrott et al., A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue, HOUSING
FIN. POL’Y CTR.
COMMENTARY
10–11
(July
2014),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413181-A-Johnson-Crapo-Dialogue.pdf
(quoting
Laurie Goodman, Housing Finance Policy Center Director, expressing doubt that “we will
get GSE reform through legislation, at least in my professional life.”).
147. See Finkle, supra note 145 (“[T]he status quo is difficult to overcome in part
because the government is generating huge profits from the GSEs, which remain in
conservatorship.”).
148. See JIM PARROTT, URBAN INST., HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY:
WHY LONG-TERM GSE REFORM REQUIRES CONGRESS 1 (May 22, 2014), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413128-Why-Long-Term-GSE-Reform-RequiresCongress.pdf. However, there is by no means consensus that housing reform legislation
should be passed. See Nick Timiraos, Investor Fires Salvo Against Fannie, Freddie, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 3, 2014, at A5 (noting shareholders, including prominent institutional investors,
support leaving the GSEs intact as private, standalone enterprises).
149. See Finkle, supra note 145.
150. MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, HOUSING REFORM STEPS
FORWARD 7 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2014-0325-Housing-Finance-Reform-Steps-Forward.pdf.
151. Id.
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those issued under the current housing finance system.152 For these
reasons, an overview of the key provisions of each proposed bill will aid
in the discussion of the future status of MBS in a reformed housing
finance system.
A.

Current Legislative Proposals

1. The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014
The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee
approved a housing finance reform bill sponsored by Committee Chair
Sen. Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Ranking Member Sen. Mike Crapo (RID) on May 15, 2014.153 This piece of legislation, the Housing Finance
Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 (“Johnson-Crapo”),154
was originally introduced by Sens. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Mark
Warner (D-VA).155 Johnson-Crapo is the second iteration of the CorkerWarner bill,156 having been amended to incorporate the findings from a
series of hearings held during the fall and winter of 2013 after the
Corker-Warner bill was introduced.157 The purpose of the committee
hearings was to “explor[e] essential elements necessary for reform” and
in so doing, gather bipartisan input and support for a bill with a realistic
chance of passing the full Congress and being signed into law.158
Johnson-Crapo remains consistent with the original Corker- Warner
bill,159 which served as the “base text” and whose “overall
See infra Part IV.B.
Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141.
Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th
Cong. § 101 (2014).
155. Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141.
156. Id.
157. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Johnson,
Crapo Announce Agreement on Housing Finance Reform (Mar. 11, 2014) [hereinafter
Johnson,
Crapo
Announce
Agreement
on
Housing
Finance
Reform],
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&C
ontentRecord_id=ef6c85f2-9ba5-ccf0-6a01-1d83fcf2f502&Region_id=&Issue_id=.
158. Id.
159. Corker-Warner, also S. 1217, was a bipartisan housing finance reform bill
originally introduced to the Senate on June 25, 2013. See MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS,
MOODY’S ANALYTICS, EVALUATING CORKER-WARNER 1 (July 8, 2013), available at
https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2013-07-08-Evaluating-CorkerWarner.pdf.
152.
153.
154.
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architecture” was maintained.160
Among the competing housing finance reform proposals,
Johnson-Crapo likely holds the most promise of serving as the
foundation for any reform that eventually succeeds in passing the full
Congress.161 The Senate Banking Committee received praise for its
careful and methodical consideration of the multitude of issues raised
by legislation of this complexity during the hearing process.162 JohnsonCrapo also has the backing of the Obama administration, although this
was not enough to secure the votes of six holdout Democrats on the
committee.163 While Johnson-Crapo is currently the most viable
proposal, it still suffers from a lack of support among both Democrats,
who are concerned with its effects on affordable housing, and
Republicans, who criticize the size of the government’s role under the
bill.164
The change in committee leadership after the 2014 midterm
elections will likely cause significant headwinds for Johnson-Crapo.
Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) is in line to serve as the next chairman of
the Banking Committee with Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) the presumed
ranking Democrat.165 Significantly, both senators voted against JohnsonCrapo during the full committee vote in May 2014.166 As a result of the
leadership change, the Republican-controlled Senate Banking
Committee will focus on either drafting a new bill or amending

160. Johnson, Crapo Announce Agreement on Housing Finance Reform, supra note
141; see also ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 1.
161. Nick Timiraos, Fannie-Freddie Overhaul Hits Snag: Thin Democratic Support,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2014, at A5. The Senate Banking Committee approved Johnson-Crapo
on a 13-9 vote with seven Republicans and six Democrats in favor, whereas the competing
House bill received no support from Democrats.). Although bipartisan support for JohnsonCrapo was met with bipartisan dissent, the competing House PATH bill passed a committee
vote with only Republican support. See Finkle, supra note 145.
162. Mel Martinez & George Mitchell, Johnson-Crapo Proposal Keeps Hope Alive for
Housing Finance
Reform, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/housing/2014/04/23/johnson-crapo-proposal-keeps-hopealive-housing-finance-reform.
163. Jon Prior & MJ Lee, Senate Banking Approves Bill to End Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, POLITICO (May 15, 2014, 11:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/senatebanking-committee-fannie-freddie-vote-end-106719.html.
164. Id.
165. Victoria Finkle, How Shelby Will Guide the Banking Committee Again, AM.
BANKER (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_213/how-shelby-willguide-the-banking-committee-194151-again-1071052-1.html.
166. Id.; Timiraos, supra note 161.
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Johnson-Crapo.167
Johnson-Crapo mandates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to wind
up and revokes their charters.168 Johnson-Crapo also creates a new
federal agency called the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation
(“FMIC”) to regulate the mortgage finance market.169 The FMIC would
be an independent regulator modeled after the FDIC serving a dual role
as both MBS insurer and rule maker.170 In addition to these key
provisions, Johnson-Crapo calls for private capital to take the first-loss
position ahead of FMIC insurance; that is, private actors will absorb
losses on FMIC-backed securities up to a specified percentage of the
principal of the MBS before the FMIC is required to cover any losses.171
As an MBS insurer, the FMIC would first be charged with establishing
a common securitization platform organized as a member- owned
Investors in new securitizations from the platform
utility.172
would receive an explicit government guarantee of timely payment of
principal and interest from the FMIC.173 However, the FMIC guarantee
would only be implicated when the private capital buffer required by the
statute is exhausted.174 Johnson-Crapo requires private market actors to
take a first-loss position of “not less than 10 percent of the principal or
face value of the single-family covered security at the time of
issuance.”175 Therefore, the FMIC offers an explicit, but limited,
government guarantee. The FMIC would provide this guarantee
through a newly-created Mortgage Insurance Fund, which would be
financed by fees assessed on securitizations and backed by the full faith
and credit of the U.S. Treasury.176
As a rulemaking regulator, the FMIC would be charged with
Finkle, supra note 165.
Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th
Cong. § 101 (2014).
169. Id. § 201.
170. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 1.
171. S. 1217 § 302.
172. Id. § 321.
173. Id. § 303.
174. Id. § 302.
175. Id. The statute allows the private capital first-loss position to take the form of an
approved bond guarantor providing insurance or a capital markets transaction to absorb
credit losses. For a detailed explanation of the credit-sharing methods in Johnson-Crapo,
see SEAN HOSKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-5700, EXPLANATION AND ILLUSTRATION
OF THE JOHNSON-CRAPO GSE REFORM PROPOSAL 8 (Apr. 7, 2014).
176. S. 1217 § 303.
167.
168.
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creating “securitization standards and underwriting requirements in
loans that make up securities backed by the government.”177 FMICbacked securities would only be comprised of mortgage loans meeting
certain underwriting standards.178 Johnson-Crapo directs the FMIC to
conform its underwriting standards for single-family mortgage loans
that are eligible for an FMIC guarantee to the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage rule.179 In addition, the rule
requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% for first-time homebuyers
and 5% for non-first-time homebuyers.180 Taken together, the explicit
government backstop, private capital buffer, uniform underwriting
standards, as well as many other provisions not discussed here, are
intended to “provide[] certainty to investors and homeowners through
standardization and improved market liquidity.”181
Johnson-Crapo establishes a “Small Lender Mutual,” an
additional provision to increase liquidity.182 The entity would seek to
ensure small lenders have access to the secondary mortgage market by
purchasing and aggregating eligible loans from these lenders for
securitization.183
Johnson-Crapo appears to be the leading prospect for housing
finance reform legislation.184 However, its hybrid public-private
approach contrasts with the proposed legislation approved by the House
Financial Services Committee, which calls for the near complete

177. Victoria Finkle & Donna Borak, Cheat Sheet: Details from the Johnson-Crapo
MORTGAGE
NEWS
(Mar.
17,
2014),
GSE
Bill,
NAT’L
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/cheat-sheet-details-from-thejohnson-crapo-gse-bill-1041363-1.html.
178. S. 1217 § 2(29)(A) (defining “eligible single-family mortgage loan”).
179. Id. § 2(29)(A)(i)(II). The CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage rule, codified at 12 C.F.R. §
1026 (2013), requires borrowers to have a debt-to-income ratio of less than 43%, prohibits
lenders charging excessive fees and points, and also prohibits lenders from underwriting
mortgage loans with high-risk features like interest-only payments, negative amortization,
and balloon payments.
180. S. 1217 § 2(29)(A).
181. Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141.
182. S. 1217 § 315. Insured depository institutions with less than $500 billion in total
assets and non-depository mortgage originators with a minimum net worth of $2.5 million
and less than $100 billion in annual mortgage loan production are eligible to participate in
the Small Lender Mutual. § 315(e).
183. See id. § 315(b) (describing the purpose of the “Small Lender Mutual”).
184. See Prior & Lee, supra note 163 (stating Johnson-Crapo has bipartisan support in
the Senate and support from the White House although it also suffers from bipartisan
opposition in the Senate).
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privatization of the mortgage finance system.185

2. Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R.
2767
On July 24, 2013, the House Financial Services Committee
passed the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of
2013 (“PATH”).186 Twelve fact-finding hearings, most of which
centered on the themes of failed government regulation and how best to
create a sustainable private mortgage finance market, produced
PATH.187 Significantly, no Democrats on the Republican-led Financial
the
Services Committee voted for the proposal.188 However,
Republican committee majority led by its chairman, Rep. Jeb
Hensarling (R-TX), was sufficient to move PATH forward despite
Democratic opposition and two Republican committee members also
voting against the measure.189
Neither Johnson-Crapo190 nor PATH managed to enlist the
support necessary for a vote on the floors of their respective
chambers.191 As previously noted, PATH did not attract the vote of a
single Democrat, whereas Johnson-Crapo garnered bipartisan
support.192 Furthermore, PATH attracted negative responses from
outside Congress including being labeled an “unviable proposal” by
Moody’s Chief Economist Mark Zandi.193 PATH, however, is not
See infra Part IV.A.2.
PATH Act Passes Committee, supra note 141.
Fact Finding: 11 Hearings on Sustainable Housing Finance Reforms in 2013, THE
COMMITTEE
ON
FIN.
SERVICES
BLOG
(July
17,
2013),
http://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=341681.
188. Finkle, supra note 145.
189. Cheyenne Hopkins, House Committee Approves Hensarling’s Housing-Finance
Bill, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-0724/house-committee-approves-hensarling-s-housing-finance-overhaul.html.
190. Trey Garrison, Barclays: 4 Reasons Johnson-Crapo Is Dead Until Post-Election;
Plus One Reason It May Be Dead After That, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/print/29519-barclays-4-reasons-johnson-crapo-isdead-until-post-election.
191. See Newhauser, supra note 145 (“[PATH] passed the committee, but went no
further as leadership made the calculation that the legislation could not pass the full
House.”).
192. Michael Shaw & Kate Ackley, Senate Panel Approves Housing Finance Overhaul,
CQ ROLL CALL (May 15, 2014).
193. MARK ZANDI & CRIS DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, EVALUATING PATH 1 (July
185.
186.
187.
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without its free market industry supporters.194
PATH has three overarching planks: (1) eliminate Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, (2) revamp the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”), and (3) “privatize the rest of the housing finance system.”195
The GSEs’ charters would be repealed after five years196 during which
time they would slowly be forced to transition out of the market by
raising fees charged to guarantee timely payment of principal and
interest on the MBS they securitize,197 decreasing conforming loan
limits,198 and limiting their purchases to only qualified mortgage
(“QM”) loans.199 Interestingly, with the exception of the conforming
loan limits, Fannie and Freddie are already taking these steps.200
In addition to these reforms, PATH would restrict the mortgages
and consumers that the FHA can serve201 and require the FHA “to
reduce its insurance coverage on mortgage loans from the current 100%
to 50%, while sharing the risk with private investors.”202 According to
Mark Zandi, Moody’s Chief Economist, under the PATH regime “the
FHA would account for no more than one-fifth of the mortgage market
on average” with private mortgage loans with no government support
accounting for the remaining four-fifths of the mortgage market.203
PATH envisions privatizing the mortgage market by
establishing a not-for-profit, non-governmental national mortgage
market utility to operate a common securitization platform for
residential MBS and “develop standards related to originating,
17,
2013),
https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2013-07-17-EvaluatingPATH.pdf.
194. JASON FREDERICK & NATHANIEL KARP, BBVA RESEARCH ECON. WATCH, THE
FUTURE OF FINANCING AMERICA’S HOMES: AN EXPANDED PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE CAN
REDUCE SYSTEMIC RISK 15 (May 27, 2014), available at https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/140524_EconomicWatchEEUU_2281.pdf (“Of all the current
reform proposals, the PATH Act moves the system closer to an ideal in which private
entities operate a Common Securitization Platform and participate in the origination and
guarantee of mortgage-backed securities.”).
195. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1.
196. Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 2767, 113th
Cong. § 110 (2013).
197. Id. § 104; ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1.
198. H.R. 2767 § 105; ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1
199. H.R. 2767 § 107; see Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 129C(b), 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)
(2012) (defining QM loans).
200. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1.
201. H.R. 2767 § 232.
202. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1.
203. Id. at 2.
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servicing, pooling, and securitizing residential mortgage loans.”204
PATH would also clear the way for covered bonds to provide an
additional source of funding for the mortgage market.205 Unlike
securitizations, where the mortgage loans backing the MBS are sold,
covered bonds are backed by pooled loans that the issuing bank retains
on its balance sheet.206 The virtue of this risk retention is the incentive
it provides to covered bond issuers to “maintain high origination
standards” which “tends to align the interests of the banks and
regulators in a way that securitisation never will.”207 Although covered
bonds are common in Europe, no significant covered bond market exists
in the United States due to the lack of enabling legislation or regulatory
guidance such as that proposed by PATH.208
Enabling a covered bond market in the United States would aid
in PATH’s goal of attracting more private financing to the mortgage
market.209 However, there are various regulatory impediments to
issuing covered bonds in the United States including lack of incentives
due to regulations like the LCR, which does not classify covered bonds
as HQLA.210
Some industry commentators are critical of PATH, asserting
that any advantages it might offer are outweighed by higher costs and
reduced access to mortgage financing.211 Nonetheless, proponents of
PATH refute these claims and assert that PATH would actually make
mortgage financing more affordable than under the current law.212
3. The Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014 (H.R.
5055)
Reps. John Delaney (D-MD), John Carney, (D-DE), and Jim
204.
205.
206.

H.R. 2767 § 312.
§ 353.
Anna T. Pinedo & Jerry R. Marlatt, Seizing the Opportunity, Int’l Fin. L. Rev.,
July/Aug. 2014, at 64.
207. Id.
208. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 2.
209. See Pinedo & Marlatt, supra note 206 (advocating for the regulatory changes to
increase the use of covered bonds as part of a diversity of private funding for the U.S.
mortgage market).
210. Id.
211. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 3 (Adopting PATH “would drive mortgage
rates nearly 90 basis points higher than they currently are.”).
212. PATH Act Passes Committee, supra note 142.
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Himes (D-CT) introduced the Partnership to Strengthen
Homeownership Act to the House on July 10, 2014.213 The proposed
bill has been referred to the House Financial Services Committee for
consideration214 and Representative Delaney hopes it will be considered
in 2015.215 Unlike PATH, this third alternative for housing finance
reform legislation seeks to maintain government involvement in the
housing market by establishing an insurance program through Ginnie
Mae.216
The Delaney bill envisions a public-private hybrid housing
finance system similar to Johnson-Crapo.217 Unlike Johnson-Crapo’s
10% private capital buffer, however, the Delaney bill only calls for
private capital to take a 5% first-loss position on insured MBS.218
Ginnie Mae and a private reinsurer would share the exposure to the
remaining 95% of the guaranteed principal amount.219 Ginnie Mae’s
portion of the insurance would be backed by the full faith and credit of
the U.S. government, giving these MBS a semi-government
guarantee.220 Similar to both Johnson-Crapo and PATH, the Delaney
bill would also revoke Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s charters.221
B.

Treatment of Mortgage-Backed Securities After GSE Reform

Given the recent adoption of the final LCR rule, passage of a
housing finance reform bill into law may complicate financial
213. Press Release, Office of Rep. John Delaney, Delaney, Carney, and Himes
Introduce
Housing
Finance
Reform
Legislation
(July
10,
2014),
http://delaney.house.gov/news/press-releases/delaney-carney-and-himes-introduce-housingfinance-reform-legislation.
214. Press Release, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., New Housing Finance Reform
Measure Introduced in House, Funding for NHTF Included (July 11, 2014), available at
http://nlihc.org/article/new-housing-finance-reform-measure-introduced-house-fundingnhtf-included.
215. Finkle, supra note 145.
216. Delaney, Carney, and Himes Introduce Housing Finance Reform Legislation, supra
note 212.
217. Finkle, supra note 145.
218. Id.
219. Jacob Gaffney & Ben Lane, New Legislation Will Break Apart and Sell Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac; House Democrats Introduce New GSE Reform Measure,
HOUSINGWIRE (July 10, 2014), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/30607-newlegislation-will-break-apart-and-sell-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac.
220. Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. §
202 (2014).
221. Id. § 305.
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institutions’ efforts to comply with the LCR. The issue centers on the
LCR’s classification of MBS for HQLA purposes. The LCR’s
classification of GSE MBS as Level 2A imposes a capital haircut and
portfolio composition caps on these assets.222 These restrictions make
GSE MBS less attractive as a means of complying with the LCR than
Level 1 assets223 such as cash, U.S. Treasury securities, and Ginnie Mae
MBS.224 The Agencies noted that as a government agency Ginnie
Mae’s obligations are explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit
of the U.S. government,225 whereas the Agencies designated GSE MBS
Level 2A assets because they are not explicitly guaranteed by the
federal government.226 In contrast, private label MBS, even AAA rated
private label MBS, do not qualify as HQLA and, therefore, do not count
towards compliance with the LCR.227
The Agencies adopted the LCR in a world where Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, under government conservatorship but nonetheless
without an explicit government guarantee, issue nearly all MBS.228 The
three leading housing finance reform proposals, however, all call for the
elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.229 Based on the
distinctions drawn in the LCR between MBS with an explicit
government guarantee (Ginnie Mae MBS) and those without such a
guarantee (GSE MBS and private label MBS), the passage of any
housing finance reform legislation requires an assessment of how
newly-issued MBS will be classified under a new regime for LCR
purposes.
The PATH Act provides the most cut-and-dried example of
222. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61440, 61529–30 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
223. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 5 (“[S]ome categories
of assets, such as non-investment-grade corporate debt securities and private label
residential mortgage-backed securities, will have no value for purposes of U.S. liquidity
requirements.”).
224. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at
61529.
225. Id. at 61456.
226. Id. at 61458 (noting that while the GSEs are under conservatorship they are
effectively guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, but not explicitly).
227. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 1.
228. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14.
229. Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th
Cong. § 101 (2014); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R.
2767, 113th Cong. § 110 (2013); Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014,
H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 103 (2014).
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housing finance reform legislation that does not address the conflict it
creates with the LCR’s HQLA definitions.230 Given that nearly the
entire mortgage finance market would be privatized under PATH,231 it
is safe to say that MBS issued by the national mortgage market utility’s
platform would be designated as private label MBS for purposes of the
LCR.232 Under this system, the only MBS that would qualify as HQLA
would be those issued by Ginnie Mae which would still receive a Level
1 designation.233
The public-private hybrid mortgage finance systems proposed
by Johnson-Crapo and the Delaney bill are not so black and white.
Under Johnson-Crapo, FMIC-backed MBS would come with a full faith
and credit guarantee.234 However, the 10% private capital first-loss
position suggests that these securities might be designated as private
label considering Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and private mortgage
insurers collectively lost less than half that amount as a result of the
2008 financial crisis.235 A private capital level that high would “all but
eliminat[e] taxpayers’ exposure to risk” because the 2008 financial
crisis and housing crash resulted in losses less than half that amount.236
Furthermore, the FMIC guarantee could more accurately be called a
limited guarantee given the first-loss position of private capital and the
high unlikelihood that the full faith and credit guarantee would ever be
drawn upon.237 Although the Agencies would probably characterize
FMIC-backed securities as having an explicit government guarantee
and, therefore, Level 1 HQLA, at least one industry group sees enough
doubt in such a future classification that it proposed changing Johnson230.
231.
232.

See H.R. 2767 § 110 et seq.
ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1.
See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 61440, 61529 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) (defining
HQLA).
233. See id. (defining “[a] security that is issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as to
the timely payment of principal and interest by, a U.S. government agency . . . whose
obligations are fully and explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S.
government” as a Level 1 asset); see also GINNIE MAE, supra note 103 (stating that Ginnie
Mae is a “wholly-owned government corporation within the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD)” that issues MBS explicitly guaranteed by the U.S.
government).
234. S. 1217 § 303(d)(9).
235. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 2 (stating that a 10% private capital buffer
would “all but eliminat[e] taxpayers’ exposure to risk”).
236. Id.
237. Martinez & Mitchell, supra note 162.
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Crapo’s text to classify such securities as Level 1 HQLA.238
The housing finance system called for by the Delaney bill
makes a stronger case for having an explicit government guarantee.
MBS issued under that bill’s Ginnie Mae public-private insurance
sharing scheme would have an explicit government guarantee for 95%
of the MBS face value—the portion that Ginnie Mae would be
responsible for insuring.239 Under this proposal, the private capital firstloss position is only 5%240 compared with 10% under Johnson-Crapo.241
However, whether MBS issued under the Delaney legislative regime
would qualify as HQLA under the LCR is uncertain without further
regulatory or legislative guidance.
The adoption of the final LCR rule and the various housing
finance reform legislative proposals currently before Congress raise the
question of whether MBS in the future will be treated more like Level 1
Ginnie Mae MBS or more like private label MBS. Whether or to what
degree MBS qualify as HQLA after housing finance reform has
significant implications for the housing market because the LCR
provides an incentive for financial institutions to prefer HQLA over
non-HQLA like private label MBS.242 If housing finance reform
legislation creates a system where the vast majority of MBS are defined
as private label non-HQLA, then financial institutions will have less
incentive to hold these assets on their balance sheets.243
V. MAINTAINING CAPITAL IN THE HOUSING MARKET AFTER HOUSING
FINANCE REFORM
The current housing finance system needs to be reformed.244
The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as wards of the state is

238. STRUCTURED FIN. INDUS. GRP., JOHNSON-CRAPO BRIEFING BOOK 15 (Apr. 21,
2014),
available
at
http://www.sfindustry.org/images/uploads/pdfs/JohnsonCrapo%20Briefing%20Book.pdf.
239. Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. §
202 (2014).
240. Id.
241. Finkle & Borak, supra note 177.
242. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, supra note 18, at 10.
243. See, e.g., id.
244. MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, COST OF HOUSING
FINANCE REFORM 5 (Nov. 20, 2013), available at https://www.economy.com/markzandi/documents/2013-11-20-Cost-of-Housing-Finance-Reform.pdf.
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unsustainable,245 but any meaningful GSE reform requires
comprehensive action by Congress.246 The need for reform is made
even stronger by the importance of the housing market to the U.S.
economy.247 However, all housing finance reform plans will raise
mortgage rates and negatively impact the housing market and the
national economy.248 For this reason, it is critical that any reform
legislation minimizes the costs to the housing market and maintains
adequate capital in the secondary mortgage market.
The exclusion of private label MBS from HQLA in the final
LCR rule may decrease liquidity in the secondary mortgage market as
financial institutions shift their capital to other assets.249 Under the
current housing finance system, the Agencies found that excluding
private label MBS would not cause any liquidity issues because
financial institutions would not be deterred from investing in these
securities despite the regulatory disincentives.250 However, the passage
of housing finance reform legislation combined with the final LCR
definitions of HQLA may create a significant deterrent effect resulting
in an unintended capital shortage in the secondary mortgage market.251
During the public comment period for the LCR, nearly every
financial institution expressed their concern that the classification of
GSE MBS as Level 2A assets and the exclusion of private label
mortgage-backed securities would shift banks’ balance sheets away
from these assets.252 Such a shift in assets, they argued, would decrease
the funding available for mortgages and raise mortgage interest rates,
House Committee Passes Sweeping Housing Finance Reform Bill, NAT’L COUNCIL
STATE HOUSING AGENCIES BLOG (July 24, 2013), http://www.ncsha.org/blog/housecommittee-passes-sweeping-housing-finance-reform-bill.
246. See PARROTT, supra note 148.
247. Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Johnson,
Crapo
Release
Housing
Finance
Reform
Text
(Mar.
16,
2014),
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&C
ontentRecord_id=f8f64d97-d732-3aa9-e966-6040d7dbf169&Region_id=&Issue_id= (“The
housing market accounts for nearly twenty percent of the American economy . . . .”).
248. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 244, at 5.
249. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, supra note 18, at 10.
250. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.
61440, 61465 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329).
251. See supra Part IV.B.
252. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, supra note 91, at 21–22 (“These
limitations are likely to incentivize banks to reduce their holdings of GSE MBS, thereby
resulting in an increase in mortgage loan interest rates to consumers and a negative effect on
the housing market and the broader economy generally.”).
245.

OF

2015]

HOUSING FINANCE REFORM AND THE LCR

85

thereby making it much more difficult and expensive for consumers to
obtain mortgage financing.253
This problem of shifting capital away from GSE and private
label MBS to more liquid assets would only be exacerbated by housing
finance legislation that eliminates the GSEs without replacing them with
an entity to issue MBS with comparable HQLA treatment or providing a
means for private label MBS to qualify as HQLA.254 Under a fully
privatized mortgage finance market like the one called for by PATH, all
MBS would be private label MBS255 and, therefore, excluded from
HQLA.256 In such a system, banks would have less incentive to hold
MBS on their balance sheets.257 The secondary mortgage markets
would feel the pinch as banks sell off their existing MBS holdings and
redirect capital into other assets that qualify for inclusion in the LCR.258
A shift by financial institutions away from investment in mortgage
securities would be economically significant. U.S. depository
institutions hold $951.4 billion worth of GSE MBS, $136.6 billion
worth of private label MBS, as well as $193.4 billion worth of GSE
debt.259 In comparison, U.S. depository institutions only hold $345.5
billion worth of U.S. Treasury securities.260 Housing reform proposals
that eliminate GSE MBS could unintentionally cause banks to reallocate
their MBS holdings to Level 1 assets like U.S. Treasuries.261 Such a
move would have profound ripple effects throughout the entire
economy beyond the impacts felt in the housing market.262
Id.
See supra Part IV.B
See supra Part IV.A.2.
See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed.
Reg. 61440, 61529 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) (defining
HQLA).
257. See, e.g., SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 3 (“[S]ome
categories of assets, such as non-investment-grade corporate debt securities and private label
residential mortgage-backed securities, will have no value for purposes of U.S. liquidity
requirements.”).
258. BUEHLER ET AL., supra note 99, at 18–19 (explaining how banks can meet LCR
requirements and optimize profitability by shifting their holdings between Level 1 and Level
2 assets in response to price signals).
259. FDIC STATISTICS, supra note 107.
260. Id.
261. BUEHLER ET AL., supra note 99, at 18–19.
262. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 244, at 5 (describing a “vicious cycle” of weakened
housing demand and a weakened economy due to much higher mortgage rates and
decreased stability of mortgage funding caused by a privatized mortgage finance system as
envisioned by the PATH Act with no MBS comparable to current GSE MBS).
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For these reasons, passage of any housing finance reform
legislation must take into account the necessity of a robust MBS market.
If Congress ultimately moves forward with a system similar to those
proposed by Johnson-Crapo and the Delaney bill, the drafters of the
legislation would be prudent to include a provision that specifically
deals with the LCR. The Structured Finance Industry Group proposed a
clause be included in Johnson-Crapo mandating that FMIC-backed
securities qualify as Level 1 HQLA for purposes of the LCR.263 The
Agencies could also accomplish the same result through new
rulemaking in response to housing finance reform legislation.
A housing finance reform proposal creating a privatized
mortgage system similar to PATH would require a different solution as
there would be no explicit government-guaranteed MBS like under
Johnson-Crapo.264 However, the Agencies or Congress could leverage
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage rule265
as well as independent credit ratings to create a class of high-quality
MBS with sufficient liquidity to warrant classification as HQLA.
The final LCR rule and current proposals for housing finance
reform legislation create the potential for an unintended shift of capital
out of the secondary mortgage market.266 This potential shift would be
a response to the regulatory incentives in the LCR for financial
institutions to hold assets that will help them to comply with the
LCR.267 Congress and federal banking regulators should be conscious
of the potential for a liquidity pinch in the secondary mortgage market
as they draft housing finance reform legislation and its accompanying
regulations.
ERIC S. ANDERSON

STRUCTURED FIN. INDUS. GRP., supra note 238, at 15.
See supra Part IV.
Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 75215 (proposed Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1026) (explaining that mortgage loans conforming with the rule represent a better
credit risk as a borrower’s ability to repay must be taken into consideration along with other
uniform underwriting standards).
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